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Abstract

Essentially, the U.S. is like a bank that serves as an intermediary for the world’s
financial assets. It sells liquid assets to the world’s savers at the price of net foreign
investment income. Foreign investors are increasingly passing on assets with higher yield
in order to purchase low-yield, but highly liquid and safe U.S. assets, such as the U.S.
dollar and U.S. Treasury securities. Consequently, there is a real threat that has emerged
as a result of the U.S.’s position as a financial intermediary to the world: a shortage of
safe assets. This shortage of safe assets matters because it suspends hope of a full
economic recovery due to the reduced nominal spending caused by these holdings. This
scenario can seriously endanger the value of the dollar and the safety of U.S. safe assets,
which would almost certainly lead to more future economic downturns. With this paper I
intend to analyze the reasons for the shortage of safe assets and the impact it has had on
the global economy and the United States in its position as a banker to the world, and
then use econometrics to quantify and prove its importance to the state of the global
economy.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With my thesis I intend to analyze the reasons for the shortage of safe assets and
the impact it has had on the global economy and the United States in its position as a
banker to the world, and then use econometrics to quantify and prove its importance to
the state of the global economy.
Over the past two decades, the rising of global imbalances in the world economy
led to many fears that eventually the world would satiate their demand for safe assets, and
that the continuously rising U.S. trade deficit would create a lack of confidence in the
United States’ safe assets, which are assets that have minimal default risk and can be
converted to cash quickly, by sale on secondary markets. As a result, the dollar would
depreciate wildly, the U.S. would lose its financing for its deficit, and a crisis would
ensue. Several years following the emergence of these theories the world did experience a
Great Recession, but global current account imbalances were not the primary culprit as
predicted; instead, the unfettered housing boom, poor regulation of financial institutions,
and controversial monetary policy decisions created a scenario in which a recession was
unavoidable. However, the dollar remained the largest reserve currency in the world,
while the U.S. Treasury bills are still the world’s safest assets. This leaves the question of
how exactly the dollar weathered the perfect storm of the Great Recession and the U.S.
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retained its ability to create the safest assets on the market. The answer lies in its role as a
banker to the world, which will be discussed in later sections.
If the United States did not experience a crisis due to their external debt obligations, then
how dangerous is the deficit to the U.S. economy? For starters, it’s important to
remember that a trade deficit is exactly equal to a capital account surplus, meaning that
the U.S.’s debt has effectively resulted in investment in the U.S. economy. Although
these illiquid investments are certainly riskier than what the U.S. is providing, the higher
yields provided help the U.S. to sustain growth. Also, the main way that the deficit would
hurt the U.S. is if it resulted in a loss of confidence in the U.S.’s assets and dollar.
Because U.S. financial markets are the most transparent, liquid, and efficient in the
world, it is unlikely that countries could find investments that are as safe anywhere in the
world. The U.S. has also acknowledged the threats posed by its excessive debt, and has
already begun to increase its savings and slightly weaken the dollar to encourage exports.
Conversely, many foreign countries’ currencies, especially China, have appreciated
which exhibits their desire to spend more. Lastly, although the U.S. could not sustain a
deficit that permanently increased relative to its gross domestic product, market forces
would eventually alter exchange rates and interest rates enough to bring the demand and
trade balance back into equilibrium.
Clearly the dangers of the world’s global imbalances were overstated, as the
United States managed to slow its spending and transition to a more sustainable path.
However, there is a real threat that has emerged as a result of the U.S.’s position as a
financial intermediary to the world: a shortage of safe assets. This shortage has largely
been then the result of emerging markets, such as China, who have high safe asset
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demand, but not an equivalent supply. The volatility of their macroeconomic procedures
results in extra risk due to their frequent crises and expansions that reduces the value of
their assets. Consequently, when the Great Recession hit these countries all desperately
wanted assets that were liquid and safe. Not being able to turn to each other, they poured
their funds into U.S. assets which don’t have the necessary supply to meet the demand.
Furthermore, the excessive demand for safe assets has pushed the return on Treasuries
extreme lows, and assets that were previously safe in Europe have been deteriorated. This
shortage of safe assets matters because it suspends any hope of a full economic recovery
due to the inhibited nominal spending that can’t take places because of the shortage. It
also creates an atmosphere where the yield on safe assets is so low, that investors begin
desperately searching for returns, which was a main contributor to the recession in the
first place. Also, the resulting Triffin dilemma creates a scenario that actually can
endanger the value of the dollar and the safety of U.S. safe assets, which would almost
certainly lead to more future economic downturns.
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CHAPTER 2

GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND THE GREAT RECESSION

For the past decade and a half, economists, policy-makers, and the media alike
have expressed major concerns over the level of global imbalances, especially in regards
to the United States. Global imbalances can be defined as “External positions of
systemically important economies that reflect distortions or entail risks for the global
economy.” (Bracke, Bussiere, Fidora, & Straub, 2008). This means that global
imbalances are the disparity of the current account balances positions of individual
economies that have a significant impact on the economy as a whole. The current account
balance is comprised of the balance of trade in a country (i.e. a country’s imports of
goods and services minus its exports of goods and services), the net factor income of a
country (i.e. it’s earnings on foreign investments minus it’s payments on foreign
investments), and cash transfers.
In the early 2000’s fears began to surface about how sustainable the U.S. current
account deficit would be in the long term. The trade deficit had been growing as a
percentage of total GDP since the 1990s, and the investment position of the U.S., that is,
the difference between U.S. owned assets abroad and foreign owned assets domestically,
had also grown even larger. Economists across the nation were raising questions
concerning how sustainable the U.S. current account deficit would be, and how
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detrimental the inevitable reversal would be to the economy. It could either be a slow and
gradual transition or come in as a “hard landing” in which investors pull out of U.S.
dollar-denominated assets for fear of the U.S. not being able to pay back its debt and the
subsequent run on the United States financial system (Poole, Coughlin, & Pakko, 2004).
The current account deficit in the United States reached unprecedented heights in
the mid-2000’s, intensifying the fears of a currency crisis in which the dollar would
rapidly depreciate and result in a debilitating recession. The global imbalances became a
double-edged sword, because as the United States received increasing inflows of foreign
capital to finance the trade deficit, it also accumulated a continuously growing federal
debt (Fiorentini, 2011). However, these imbalances didn’t result solely as a consequence
of the United States’ population buying more than they were producing, though that
certainly played its part. One potential explanation for the current account deficit was
given by former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, in the form of his Global
Savings Glut Hypothesis. This theory proposed that the desire for excess savings by
aging foreign markets resulted in high current account deficits and low treasury yields in
the U.S. (Bernanke, 2005).
When these fears of a currency crisis first emerged, there were two schools of
thought regarding their importance and potential impact: the Dr. Doom School and the
Dr. Pangloss School. One of the main proponents of the danger of global imbalances and
the “hard landing” scenario was economist Nouriel Roubini, a New York University
professor dubbed by the media as “Dr. Doom.” In his book, Crisis Economics, he
discusses how he started to see disturbing trends in the U.S. current account balance he
thought would lead to a devastating U.S. recession and a global slowdown. He warned
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that at some point, emerging-market demand for US assets would be sated and that
emerging markets would conclude that US assets were no longer safe. The dollar would
crash and financial institutions would be caught wrong-footed, and a crisis would result
(Roubini & Mihm, 2010). The second major school of thought regarding the global
imbalances situation was the Dr. Pangloss School, named after the famous optimist of the
Voltaire satire, Candide. Economists who subscribed to this school viewed the global
imbalances as a structural result of emerging economies demand for dollar reserves,
which the U.S. happily traded for cheap imports (Eichengreen, 2014).
However, Figure 2.1 shows us that even though the United States’ current account
deficit as a percent of gross world product reached alarming levels before the recession,
they have since narrowed and no longer present the danger of a dollar crisis or a run on
United States financial institutions, as the United States is consciously attempting to
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of Gross World Product
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Figure 2.1 shows the extent of the disparity between the U.S.’s current account deficit
and other major economies. Data Source: (World Economic Outlook, 2014)
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This proves the fallacies in both schools of thought. The United States did
experience a severe recession during the Global Financial Crisis, but clearly it wasn’t as a
result of the large current account deficit. Instead, the housing boom of the mid-2000s
burst when subprime borrowers foreclosed on their mortgages, resulting in a collapse of
many financial institutions that had created new, high-yield investment securities in order
to compensate for the low interest rates on safe assets. The global imbalances may have
increased the severity of the recession due to the increase of savings from emerging
economies that were then plugged into the unsafe mortgage-backed securities, but they
were not the primary cause. Instead, the United States recognized the dangers of
excessive debt, and accordingly increased its savings and weakened the dollar to
encourage exports. (Eichengreen, 2014) The dollar did not suffer, as predicted; instead,

Figure 2.2 shows the USD index evaluated by FXStreet.com (US Dollar Index, 2014). It
evaluates how the U.S. dollar performed against a basket of currencies including the euro,
pound, Japanese yuan, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, and Swedish krona.
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the dollar actually benefited, because foreign investors deposited their funds into United
States Treasury bills, as they were desperate for safe assets. Figure 2.2 shows how the
dollar’s exchange rate behaved when weighted against a basket of currencies over the last
ten years. When the Great Recession occurred, the dollar did not spiral out of control as
the Dr. Roubini predicted; instead it depreciated to an acceptable level that would allow
the U.S. to bring in cheaper exports in order to begin to close the global imbalances gap.
However, the question remains that if the global imbalances were perceived to be such a
threat to the U.S. economy and currency, how did the U.S. escape the impending crisis
presented by its debt obligations?
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CHAPTER 3

THE UNITED STATES AS A BANKER TO THE WORLD
To answer the question raised in the previous section, it’s important to understand
the United States’ role as a banker to the world. Essentially, the U.S. is a bank that serves
as an intermediary for the world’s financial assets, and sells liquid (i.e. can be sold
quickly and with no discount to its price) assets to the world’s savers at the price of net
foreign investment income. The foreign investors will pass on assets with higher yield in
order to purchase low-yield, but highly liquid and safe U.S. assets (Neilson, 2012). For
example, when a retail bank that provides service to the general public receives a deposit
from a customer, that money goes into a general pool along with everyone else’s and that
customer is credited for the amount of the deposit. The bank will then use that money to
make loans to other customers or businesses, charging them a higher interest than it is
paying the depositing customer, so that it can turn a profit. The United States functions
almost identically in the world economy. The U.S. sells Treasuries, other government
securities, and corporate debt to foreign savers who want safe, liquid assets, while it buys
capital flows such as foreign equities and direct investments which boost the economy
and have higher yields.
In order to show the U.S.’s central role in international financial markets, Figure
3.1 shows the U.S. liabilities to foreign markets in total U.S. dollars, while Figure 3.2
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shows those liabilities in percentages of total liabilities.

Figure 3.1 shows the U.S. liabilities to foreign markets, in U.S. dollars. Data for Figures
3.1-3.4 (Financial Accounts of the United States, 2014)
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Figure 3.2 shows the U.S. liabilities to foreign markets, in percentages of total liabilities.

Figure 3.3 shows U.S. claims on foreign markets, in U.S. dollars.
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Figure 3.4 shows U.S. claims on foreign markets, in percentages of total liabilities.

In Figure 3.1, the liabilities in either gray or blue are what are referred to as “safe
assets.” They are highly liquid and have a nearly infallible guarantee that they will be
paid back, because they are predominantly backed by the U.S. government or large
financial institutions. The liabilities in pink or red are considered unsafe assets, which are
riskier because many are privately owned and have a higher chance of default. These
unsafe assets carry a higher risk premium, which results in a higher yield upon maturity.
Figure 3.2 shows these same liabilities in terms of percentages of the total liabilities.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 use the same format as the previous two graphs, but show the U.S.
claims on foreign markets. Figures 3.1 and 3.3 show that the levels of U.S. liabilities are
nearly identical to the levels of U.S. assets, which exemplify the United States’ role as a
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financial intermediary. By looking at 3.2 and 3.4, we can see that foreign markets are
much more interested in purchasing the United States’ safe assets, which comprise nearly
40 to 50 percent of U.S. liabilities. The
70

Billions of Dollars

60

Balance on Investment Income

50
40
30
20
10
0

Figure 3.5 shows the net foreign investment income that the U.S. receives on its assets
owned abroad minus its liabilities owed to foreign markets. The highly positive interest
income in later years exemplifies the United States’ role as a banker to the world. Data
received from (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2014).

U.S., on the other hand, only invests approximately 10 to 15 percent of safe assets from
abroad. This discrepancy proves that the United States is seeking net foreign investment
income, meaning that it is earning significantly more on its liabilities owned abroad than
it pays out to investors, which is shown in Figure 3.5.
The trade deficit is exactly equal to the surplus in the capital account plus the
financial account; this occurs not simply because the U.S. is borrowing from foreigners in
the traditional sense, but because the foreigners are investing in U.S. assets, which are
widely considered the safest assets in the world. The capital inflows that are received as a
result of the United States’ current account deficit kept the dollar strong, which led to
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cheaper imports and more expensive exports. This has resulted in foreigners owning 2.5
trillion dollars more in U.S. assets than the U.S. owns in foreign assets in the early 2000s.
(Poole, Coughlin, & Pakko, 2004) Another useful thing to consider is that the U.S. dollar
serves as a medium of exchange and store of value in countries all around the world,
which means that the U.S. has a significant pull on all international monetary policy.
As portfolio adjustments exploit new diversification opportunities (i.e. invest in
new, safe assets that are created as a result of the high demand for safe assets) and as
growth continues abroad in commodity-exporting countries, the U.S. current account
deficit will gradually stabilize and return to manageable levels without any needed drastic
adjustments in monetary policy or exchange rates (Poole, Coughlin, & Pakko, 2004).
Before the debt obligations overtake the country’s national income, market forces will
direct exchange rates, interest rates, and growth rates in a way that will put the U.S. on a
sustainable path, so the massive current account deficit will not be seriously detrimental
to the U.S. economy in the long run.
The main risk that the United States could encounter is if it faces illiquidity, and
experiences a run in which it could not raise funds to pay for foreigners all clamoring to
be paid at the same time. If some panic entices foreigners to stop lending and investing
and be paid back in cash, then the “bank” of the U.S. could potentially fail due to the
inability to transfer assets into cash quickly. However, it is unlikely that this would
happen anytime soon, because liquidity and safe assets are in high demand and there is no
safer source of those than the U.S (Neilson, 2012).
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, this cycle inevitably results in a
current account deficit for the U.S., which means that its purchases of goods and services
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from abroad are greater than its sales to foreign countries. Consequently, the amount of
dollar-denominated assets and actual currency owned abroad has resulted in a fiscal
variation of the Triffin dilemma for the United States, which results when foreign
demand for reserve assets exceeds the amount required to meet domestic demand. This
paradox means that the U.S. has to provide more safe, liquid assets than is needed
domestically. This strains the U.S.’s ability to create and supply enough sound assets to
foreign investors to meet demand (Farhi, Gourinchas, & Rey, 2011). The global
imbalances and Global Financial Crisis have resulted in a shortage of safe assets in the
world economy.
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CHAPTER 4

THE SHORTAGE OF SAFE ASSETS

One of the main articles published on the shortage of safe assets is On the
Macroeconomics of Asset Shortages by MIT professor, Ricardo J. Cabellero. Originally,
the asset shortage was mostly prominent in emerging markets due to financial instability,
but it is now more evident on a global scale, beginning with the Japanese asset meltdown
of the 1990s, European asset stagnation in the late 1990s, and further inflamed by the
massive growth of China and expanding commodity countries, who have high safe asset
demand, but not an equivalent supply. Emerging markets are an issue for three main
reasons: their lack of management experience leads to a chronic asset shortage, the
tendency to attribute the global imbalances to these countries, and their collective crises
and their rapid expansions. The volatility of their macroeconomic procedures results in
extra risk that reduces the value of their assets. The major solution to this economic
volatility is financial development, where sound assets could remove the potential for
speculative bubbles. Essentially, emerging markets have rapid and frequent expansionary
and recessionary cycles, large global imbalances, low interest rates, and financial panics
which contribute to the asset shortages (Cabellero, On the Macroeconomics of Asset
Shortages, 2006).
Ultimately, the shortage of safe assets matters for several reasons. One
major reason is that safe assets serve as a medium of exchange. Therefore, the shortage of
16

safe assets creates an excess money demand for investors that decreases the
amount of nominal expenditures in the economy (Beckworth, 2011). If investors have a
high demand to hold on to their money for fear of investing in unsafe assets or because
they are unable to find a safe asset with a satisfactory yield, then they won’t fuel
consumption or investment in the economy which results in an overall reduction of Gross
Domestic Product and international transactions. Furthermore, the consequential Triffin
dilemma that was mentioned in a previous section causes the U.S. to consistently run
current account deficits, which put pressure on its ability to create safe assets.
One major issue with creating value for assets in the world economy is that just
because a country can produce output, that doesn’t mean they will be able to sell the
rights to that capital and consequently create an asset. The United States has the most
efficient, transparent, and safe financial markets in the world, so even another country
was capable of producing assets that they could ensure were safe and liquid, it is unlikely
that it would produce a safe asset shock large enough to stimulate the global economy.
Another way to help increase the value of assets is an endogenous real interest rate drop,
which would raise the value of existing assets and cover part of the asset shortage. A drop
in inflation or deflation would also revalue assets and decrease the shortage (Cabellero,
On the Macroeconomics of Asset Shortages, 2006).
One other potential solution for the safe asset shortage is given in the article, How
a US Sovereign Wealth Fund Can Alleviate a Scarcity of Safe Assets, by Miles Kimball,
the author defends the benefits of the idea of a US Sovereign Wealth Fund, which
17

essentially involves having a robust supply of assets that can serve as collateral. Kimball
believes that government spending isn’t ideal due to the government debt, and buying
safe assets wouldn’t result in further safe assets available to the private sector. The
answer then is for the government to buy risky assets, which supports his proposal for a
Sovereign Wealth Fund that would shield the country from risk while diversifying its
asset portfolio (Kimball, 2013).
In a separate paper, Cabellero categorizes the two major response proposals to the
safe asset shortage problem as either arranged contingent capital injections, or arranged
contingent asset and capital insurance injections (Cabellero, The "Other" Imbalance and
the Financial Crisis, 2010). Both of these responses deal directly with handling the
amount of crisis risk that is associated with this problem. The former suggests that access
to capital during crises needs to be arranged in advance, because it is often hard to raise
capital during a recession. This aims to reduce the cost of holding capital when it is not
necessary, allowing funds to be allocated more evenly and appropriately to financial
assets and capital. The latter proposal deals directly with crises expectations; essentially,
providing insurance injections means that as long as the government can assure the
general public that resources will be available during an impending crisis, then the panic
will be less pronounced and easier to deal with. Cabellero argues that a combination of
these two proposals would be necessary in the case of a safe asset shortage inspired crisis.
The emergence of the safe asset shortage problem is dangerous and counterproductive to the world economy, and although some short-term solutions exist, a longer
18

lasting, more effective solution needs to be created in order to maintain macroeconomic
growth and stability. Even though the Great Recession ended several years ago, the U.S.
economy is still not producing at levels which it could potentially have reached
beforehand, and one of the major reasons is this shortage. Despite the Recession ending,
fears of other crises such as the Euro Crisis or the fiscal cliff threats in recent years have
continued to keep the demand for safe assets high, even though there is not equivalent
supply. In the next section, I will set explain the model that I used to quantify the effect
that the shortage of safe assets has on the global economy.
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CHAPTER 5

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

In order to test the impact that this shortage of safe assets has had on the global
economy, I used econometrics to create a vector autoregression model. A vector
autoregression (VAR) is an extension of the univariate autoregressive model to dynamic
multivariate time series, and is typically used in analyzing the linear correlations and
interdependencies between different variables. In a normal regression, there is one
dependent variable that is estimated based on its relationship with a series of independent
variables. However, in a vector autoregression, every variable is a dependent variable,
forming a system of equations in which each variable is regressed on itself and other
variables. This allows each variable to evolve endogenously throughout the forecast,
meaning that as each variable changes, the others will react and transform throughout the
sample period. After estimating my model to evaluate the relationships between the
variables based on their actual data, I created an in-sample counterfactual forecast. This
means that instead of using the actual data for the level of safe, liquid assets, I forecasted
the level of safe assets that would be available if the Great Recession hadn’t occurred.
After creating the new data based on this forecast, I inserted the new potential variable
into the model in place of the actual level of safe assets. This allowed me to create a
forecast for what the levels of the variables could have been if there had been no Great
Recession, and the subsequent shortage of safe assets.
20

After creating my potential versus actual forecast, I created an impulse response
function for the data, which shows how the economy would react overtime to an
exogenous change in a variable, which in this case would be liquid assets. This allowed
me to analyze the impact that a properly timed positive safe asset shock (i.e., an increase
in safe assets) would have had on various economic indicators, thereby quantifying the
effect that the shortage of safe assets has on the global economy.
The variables that I used in my regression were as follows:


Liquid Assets: This is the focus variable, and is equal to the amount of safe, liquid
assets supplied by the U.S. economy.



Global Commodity Prices: This variable represents the prices of global
commodities such as oil, minerals, and other market driven goods and services.
Global commodities are especially important in developing and emerging
economies due to their reliance on key exports, so this variable will reflect the
growth of those economies.



Advanced Economies Industrial Production: This variable is an economic
indicator used to display the impact that the shortage of safe assets will have on
advanced economies.



Emerging and Developing Economies Industrial Production: As with the previous
variable, this economic indicator will help quantify the effect that the shortage of
safe assets will have on emerging economies.



Advanced Economies Consumer Price Index (CPI): The CPI for a group of
countries represents the price level of a market basket of goods and services, and
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is typically used as a measure of inflation in the economy. Because I am using
time-series data, CPI is included to control for inflation over time.


Emerging and Developing Economies Consumer Price Index: This variable
controls for inflation in emerging markets, which are subject to wider swings of
inflation than advanced economies.



5 Lag Operators: I included five lags of the data when producing my VAR. This
means that I regressed each variable on itself lagged five periods. Lag operators
are used to account for cyclicality in the data, reducing the serial correlations
between the residuals and resulting in white noise.

22

CHAPTER 6

RESULTS

Figure 6.1 shows the results of the vector autoregression forecast.
By using a counterfactual vector autoregression forecast, I was able to create a
forecast displaying the potential trends of the 6 variables if the Global Financial Crisis
had not occurred, resulting in a deterioration of many safe assets in the U.S. and abroad.
Obviously, there is a significant difference in the amount of safe, liquid assets. Although
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the VAR did not produce a very impressive forecast of global commodity prices, it did
show noteworthy differences in the levels of industrial production in both advanced
economies and emerging and developing economies. Clearly, the shortage of safe assets
is preventing global economies from investing because of the low yields of Treasuries
and the fear of investing in unsafe assets, which was a major stimulant of the Great
Recession. Their lack of investment due to the shortage of safe assets matters because it
suspends any hope of a full economic recovery due to the inhibited nominal spending that
can’t take places because of the shortage.

24

Figure 6.2 displays the results of the impulse response function.
The impulse response function results showed in Figure 6.2 provide some
interesting insight to what would happen to each variable if the global economy
experienced a positive safe asset shock, or an exogenous increase in the amount of liquid,
safe assets. The impulse response functions shows what would happen after the amount
of liquid assets is increased by 1 standard deviation, for 16 quarters after the initial shock.
The blue lines are confidence interval bands that represent one standard deviation on the
upper bound and lower bound of the regression results. We can only conclude that the
results are statistically significant if the upper and lower bands are above or below zero.
The most notable insights obtained from the model are the significant increases in the
global commodity prices and industrial production in emerging economies for the first
eight quarters after the initial shock. Emerging markets typically rely on oil and other
commodities as the main driving force of their economy. These results demonstrate that
in the case of a positive safe asset shock, the excess money demand of emerging markets
would be satiated, leading to an increase in aggregate nominal expenditures, and a
resolution to the problems and symptoms created by the safe asset shortage problem. The
advanced economies industrial production also experienced a statistically significant
increase in the 4th and 5th quarters after the initial shock, showing that the effects of the
Triffin dilemma are no longer inhibiting the advanced economies because there are
enough safe assets to satiate demand.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of this study thus far, it is evident that the shortage of
safe assets in the United States is having a significant effect on the economic recovery
process. A full economic recovery that attains those levels of production and spending
won’t be possible until safe asset shortage problem is resolved.
Through my research, I found a clear connection between the United States’
current account deficit and the shortage of safe assets. Even though the global imbalances
problem was not dangerous because of an impending currency crisis, it has resulted in a
Triffin dilemma as a result of the United States’ role as a financial intermediary to the
world. This dilemma has created a liquidity crisis, because the Great Recession and
Eurozone crisis destroyed many assets that were considered safe. The shortage in safe
assets has resulted in emerging markets being unable to satiate their demand, while the
United States is put under pressure in its role as a banker to the world, because it can’t
turn around and invest funds in foreign assets. This has clearly had a significant effect on
emerging economies and advanced economies industrial production, since the excess
money demand that was created as a result of this shortage has prevented them from
investing in capital and has suppressed global commodity prices, which staggers
developing economies.

26

It is hard to point out a specific resolution to the safe assets shortage problem. As
mentioned before, some believe that a revaluation of assets coupled with a period of strict
inflation targeting would bring the situation under control, while others believe that a US
Sovereign Wealth fund might create enough risk shielding that the United States can
diversify its portfolio even further, allowing for a creation of safe assets by lowering their
overall demand. Hopefully, in further research I could ascertain more potential, realistic
solutions to this problem, as well as produce further conclusive results through the use of
forecasting and econometrics.
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